Hegel and Deleuze: Immanence and Otherness
Our policy information is available from the repository home page. Philos-ophy as Practice 79 Ch. All matefial in this tbesis is my own woTk and has not been submitted previously for a degree at another university. Herzeland Gilles Deleuze. It begins by outlining a general methodological aspect of foundationalism.
In the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Schelling, this self-chtical project is transformed: they undertake to show that reason can, by examining itself gpi an give account of expenence that is systematic, or consistent with itself However, each of these thinkers fails to accomplish this, and indeect the commitment to a priori foundations is itself undermined in Schelling's work, where a philosophical crisis of meaning a 'trauma of reason', philosophical nibilism emerges. Deleuze and Hegel's contrasting critiques of foundationalism, and their positive reconstructions of the standpoint of philosophy, are then interpreted as non- foundationalist attempts to overcome this intemal cnsis of foundationalist thought as inadvertently exposed by Schelbrig.
Both Cnticise certain subJective presuppositions to foundationalist they - dogmatic common philosophies, which consider constitute a ,image' of philosophy, a kind of transcendentalillusion that is the guiding force behind foundationalism. Both also aim to replace this with a genuinely philosophical image. The thesis provides an original historical contextuali sation of Deleuze's thought in relation to Gen-nan Idealism, and Schelling in particular, with whom.
Deleuze's conception of pure difference is treated in this regard as a kind of 'absolute knowledge'. This i contextual sation also allows the sometimes crudely understood antipathy between Hegel and Deleuze to be addressedin a more penetrating fashion, which shows that thev have more in common in terms of their critical orientation than is usually supposed. Other references are to the onginal text and the English translation as per the following abbreviations and the Bibliography. And becausethere are people who make mistakes in reasoning, committing logical fallacies concermimgeven the simplest questions in geometry, and I as judged that I was just as prone to error as anyone else, I rejected as unsound all the arguments I had previously taken as demonstrative proofs.
It is this latter assurance that represents a direct assault on medievalism, for it confers final authority on the faculty of reason, and thus removes it from the hegemony of tradition and its institutions, the ultimate sources of all Scbolastic arguments previously accepted as 'demonstrative proofs'. At the close of the twentieth century, such confidence seems to be at once an intimately familiar feature of the way we imagine ourselves. Over two hundred years of 1 Descartes, , p.
This condition, which Nietzsche referred to as 'modern nihilism', finds a particularly suitable home in the twentieth century, the time of genocide carried out by regimes that employed bureaucratic reason exclusively in the service of their 'passions'. How does this situation make itself felt in Western philosophy? One definition of its violently altered self-image is given by the British philosopher Gillian Rose. Commentating on a selection of modern Jewish thinkers within the pantheons of existentialism, critical theory and post-structuralism, ranging from Martin BubeT to JacquesDerrida, Rose wrote that 'their different ways of severing existential eros from 1 philosophical logos amount to a trauma wilhin reason itsef.
Trauma in its usual meaning refers to the experiencing of a violent physiological or psychological shock that induces a pathological condition within the orgamc or the psychic system. What can it mean to say that reason expenencessuch a shock and is confined by such a condition? One thing is clear from Rose's remarks, however. This trauma cannot be reduced to an effect of conditions external to the activity of philosophy.
Philosophy, in some sense,inflicts the wound on itself To anticipate a little, we can say that the trawna of reason appears in the modem age because of the nature of the vocation that philosophy assumes for itself namely, the Cartesian epistemological prOject. The goal of my thesis is firstly to outline a convincing definition of the philosopbical provenance of the trauma of reason, and then, in the main part of the thesis, to assessthe work of two of the most trenchant critics of the modem Cartesian project, G. Hegel and Gilles Deleuze, considered as ways of 4working through' this condition that provide resourcesfor reconceiving the vocation of pbilosopby.
The sceptical metbod is a way of redefining pbilosopby according to Plato's question in the Theaeletus: 'what is knowledgeT. Descartes' vision thus still affirins philosophy as the highest discipline of human knowledge, that is, as the knoWing of the meaning qj knowledge. Critical epistemology, despite its modernity, remains knotted to the longest threads of Westem thought. A constitutive element of its definition is the distinction between philosophy, which deals with knowledge as such, and specific sciencesthat deal with particular modes of knowing: natural science, psychology, political science, economics and so on.
Behind this privilege accorded to philosophy is still the complex Greek notion of s, the 'gathering' of being that inforrns Plato's conception of dialectic and Aristotle's view of metaphysics as first philosophy.
Philosophy remains the discipline whose eros for being is pure, and which consequently possessesthe logos absolutely, gathering being for knowledge without presupposing anything specific about the nature of being. This is what divides philosophy from, for example, the natural sciences,which assume for their purposes the existence of a matter whose nature can be describedmathematicallyor empirically.
The Aristotelian and Platonic legacy to philosophy is this faith in the essential purity of reason, and in the universality of what it. Reason is the most direct form of access to being, a purer mode of seeing. Being is a medium within which reason moves without hindrance. That which actually exists, the world that enfolds everyday life and constantly upsets our plans and evadesour predictions, possessesan essential, internal order which reason can reveal precisely because it corresponds to the internal structure of reason itself the discursive interconnection of orderly entailments, of grounds and Reason, consequences.
It is always already in union with, is immanent in being. In relation to reason, our other faculties through which we become aware of the world, such as our senses,our memory and so on, must be judged and found wanting as modes of 'seeing into' being. Tbrough them, the world is necessarily distorted, for being resists them. This does not simply mean that occasionally we may be rmstaken about the world, but more radically, that the world itself appearsthrough our sensesand memory as shiffing, provisional, elusive - in short, without certainty.
Through our other faculties, the unity of reason with being is lost, and we become aware of the world as an opaque honzon of awareness; we recognise it in its otherness. This, we are sure, is becausebeing always already belonged to reason anyway. It is reason, for example, that allows us to correct the mistakes we make through relying too much on our senses. The idea of philosophy as an activity intimately bound up With the internal order of being, and which can therefore do without presuppositions about specific modes of being, already constitutes an attack on such particular presuppositions.
From Parmenides onward, the implication is that, despite their necessity in the subordinate sciences, specific assumptions about the essenceor meaning of being cannot ultimately result in anything more than a distortion of pure knowledge. The role of philosophy is therefore a in sceptical one relation to other sciences. Each 'inferior' science is linked to a specific region of being, which is cut out of the whole, as it were, through the acceptance of axiomatic presuppositions. In relation to the fundamental philosophical faith in reason, Scholasticism representedfor Descartesa negative development.
Scholastic philosophy, frorn his point of view, did not allow itself to be guided solely by the reason of the individual, but was instead assured of its status by Church dogma, a corpus of traditional beliefs whose authority was simply assumed. Consequently, the idea of the purity of the philosophical eros for being takes on an active, ascetic aspect in the Cartesian sceptical method. The certainty of reason's immanence in being cannot be secured sIM-Plythrough traditional doctrine and belief It has to be demonstrated, and this can only occur through a ftee process of reasonmg that is sceptical about all accepted beliefs, and which results in the discovery of an ob,9.
Unless this certainty is secured in this way, then it will itself remain a belief, a matter of faith. If this is the case,then the Cartesian view of philosophy as arch ofLscienceis no different from that which it cnticises. With a reality that is to really external or o1herthan the subject. All knowledgeof the world, of the soul or of God necessarily implies the presenceof subjective representationalcontent of one forrn or another. Thus it is from this content that a foundation must be extracted. It is Descartes' third methodological hypothesis. This problem of cerlainty requires its solution to be in the form of uncondifional knowledge, foundational knowledge that we immediately know to be true without further cnteria- The Cartesian cogito is supposed to serve as such mitnediate knowledge by virtue of both its content and its form- the proposition 'I am thinking' Ue pense together with the immediacy of the self-reflection that constitutes this thought is indubitable proof of my existence.
When I entertain the proposition 'I am thinking' I know this without referenceto criteria that may be doubted, indeed, to doubt the truth of this proposition is to produce a contradiction. Thought and the nature of an existent here correspond perfectly, if only temporarily, for the immediate certainty that guarantees the cogno, precisely because it is constituted in an act of attending that is supposed to be a direct seeing into the soul, only enduresso long as this attending is maintained- It is thus necessaryto go fin-ther.
The cogilo grants fon-nal certainty, for it gives us criteria for the objective correspondenceof representationand reality, narnely 'clanty' and 'distinctness', which are possessedby different classesof representation in various 3 Descartes, , p. The move from the cogilo to the proof of the existence of God is thus motivated by the needs of method, for in addition to formal criteria of certainty, it is necessaryto establish the necessaryexistence of an objective ground of the necessarycorrespondencebetween all clear and distinct ideas and 4 reality.
Again, this can only be achieved through the exarnination of subjective representations. Now, however, it is possible to go directly to the subject's store of conceplual representations, for these possess the reqwred degree of clarity and distinctness. The notion of God, Descartesreports, is unique among these concepts, for it alone represents a perfect being.
Through the notorious 'ontological proof Descartes , connects the idea of the infinite perfection that necessarily belongs to the idea of God with the idea of necessaryexistence: if God were to be thought as non-existent, then he would be imperfect and would not be God. Given that this premise produces a contradiction, God necessarilyexists, as a real ground of the objective correspondenceof our clear and distinct representationswith reality. Descartes believes that this result is a justification of the unity of subjective representation and reality, qualified by the restriction of this unity in its ftdl senseto representationsof reason.
If this is so, then Cartesian it reason proves its autonomy: will have demonstratedthat it possessesgenuine knowledge of being of the res cogiians and God , Without requiring specific presuppositions about being M order to do so. This faith is not simply a temporary postulate, but is, in the fonn of Descartes' reliance on innate ideas as tools of method, actually an assumption that goes acknowledged.
The ideas of the res cogitans and the infinitely perfect God are held to have a natural, a priori relation to being becauseof their content, for the content of either, when doubted, produces a contradiction. However, the idea that such concepts, because of their representative content thereby possess a special ontological status, is placed under 5 suspicion by the emphicists, and above aUby Locke and Hw-ne. This idea is itself, for the empiricists, an unwarranted assumption about the nature of reason, indicating a residual and reassuring faith in the immanence of a priori reason that remains unquestioned,which means that effectively Descartesalready knows the answerto his enquiry when he setsout upon it.
Pure reason only graspsbeing because being has already been gathered by reason, via an unacknowledged presupposition, and the boldness of the reason that makes God into a devil is simply sbow. Against this background assumption of the immanence of reason in being, the empiricist method concerns the genesis of representations,and of concepts in particular.
The question of how representations come to be present in the mind at all is privileged as more fundamental than the problem of how it is possible that these representations could adequatelyrepresentbemg, be and a source of objective knowledge. Tbrough his account of the origin of ideas in sensibility, the passions, and the associative principles that act as natural laws of the mind, Hume above all others constructs on an empirical basis a notion of reason as concerned only with beliefill the regularity of our subjective experience, as opposed to objective knowledge of the uniformity of the order of external being.
Ile issue is no longer the correspondence of representationswith what exists outside the subject. For Hume. Instead, its meaning comes from the relations that exist between ideas imprinted in the memory by constantly repeated instancesof pairs of impressions. The only relation of representationexists between unpressions and the ideas that literally re-present them.
The idea that it can overcome this opaqueness is the result of a misapplication of reason beyond the bounds to which it is limited by its confingent, merely given origin. The empincist critique of Descartes' defence of the immanence of reason in being is important for our tbeme of the trauma of reason. For Hume, reason is dependent on an empirical contingency that it cannot itself account for. The possibility of there being a regularity that is internal to the source of impressions, whatever it may be, cannot be thought without abstracting from the contents of the mind.
The othernessof external reality is here seen as the genetic condition of reason itself, for it somehow provides an opaque stimulus that gives nse to the habit of reasorung.
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With Kant, the validity of a priori reasoning is defended in a way that cedes ground to the empiricist critique, but then goes on to undermine it. The methodological stancereason takes with respect to itself is no longer sceptical in Descartes' sense,where one only has to nd oneself of the conditionally certain m order to ascend without difficulty to the unconditional.
Krilik as method signifies that the very capacity of reason for knowledge must itself be examined and criticised. Kant agrees widi the empiricists that pure ideas alone cannot provide an adequate measure of what constitutes genuine knowledge of objects. Hence Kant, in agreeing with the empincists, simultaneously turns against them. For Kant, it is the spontaneous and discursive-rational structure of the representing subject's consciousnessthat makes possible the kind of discriminating power that enables Hurne's subject to even tell the difference between two impressions.
For Kant, transcendental subjectivity is necessary in order to make subjective presentations possible, without which the thought of real extemality and of re-presentationswould be impossible. For Descartes,the immanence of reason in being the autonomy of philosophical reason had to be demonstrated with reference to the content of our representationsof what is. This provoked the empiricist response. Kant, however, understands the demonstration of the immanence of reason in being, of the right of reason to deten-nine what is, in a fon-nal sense.
Our very consciousnessof external objects, and even of individual impressions, is only made possible by the structure of our reason. If we can determine this conditioning structure, we will have proof of the autonomy of reason. The capacity of reason to determine 'what is' is thus conditioned by its capacity to deten-nine itself! I to be immanent to itself In this way, Kant sees reason as having the power to recognise its own limits as immanent to it - as necessitatedby its own structure, rather than being forced upon it from outside, as in Hume's account.
Reasonhas the right to a. Knowledge of these forms thus constitutes objective a priori knowledge of experience. Once this right has been proved, pure reason will have, through a consistent Critical epistemology, demonstrated that it alone has the right to truth-claims assess about being. Reason is thus, for Kant, immanent to our experience of objects, and this is demonstrated by an immanent self-examination on the part of reason.
While reason has this proper de jure , autonomous or immanent limit, it neverthelesstends to transgress it and mire itself not in error, but in transcendenial illusion, by claiming knowledge of the nature of the thing-in-itself, as in the modem rationalist tradition from Descartesto Wolff.
Kant's defence of a priori knowledge develops as a response to the Gennan Enlightenment A ujkldrung , by taking a stand against the resurgence of an unprincipled fi7ith in reason. As such it is coeval with a more direct and negative reaction against the Enlightenment, beginning with Hamaim and Herder.
Nevertheless, Kant remains allied with the Aujkldrer, raising the standard of independent, protestant reason against all traditional forms of authority, whether Church, State or academy. The struggle for the right to use one's own reason brings to light the implicit political dimension of the modem epistemological tradition: all claims to authority must present themselvesbefore the tribunal of reason and be judged.
But first, as Kant acknowledges,reason has first to criticise its to own excesses,in order provide criteria by which illegitimate claims can be exposed, and in order to justify the authority of its own tribunal. This is the central import of our presentation dius far. Despite Kant's restrictions on reason's right to detennine 'what is', however, the problem of presuppositions returns, concerning the self-consi steincy of the cntical method.
If Critical reason alone is to determine the validity of its claim to a priori knowledge, then a question arises: bow is reason's right to criticise jiselfjustified. The immanence of reason to itself has not been demonstrated,and so neither has the right of reasonto determine 'what is', even within certain limits. Massing behind the vanguard of the direct reaction against the Enlightenment and its supporter Kant, and appalled at the political and theological consequencesof unrestrained critique, opponents of the critical turn gave a different forni to the sceptical question: they raised doubts about the supposedly singular right of reason to question everything else.
One such thinker, F. Jacobi, gave a name to a pathological condition of modem thought, exemphfied by Kantian philosophy and defined by a need always to to for beliefs: nihilism. Reason's right to critique must be established, and then the right of reason to establish the right of critique, and so on. This impossible labour creates an abyss of meaninglessnessinto which all beliefs and 10 disappear. Beiser, op. We have still not yet arrived, in this account, at the point where it insinuates itself into reason itself, perhaps finallY SeN'ering,in Rose's words, eros ftom logos.
We have, however, seen reason driven back into itself, from an initially assumed position of confidence, forced to become ever more wary of its own pretensions, until, with the reaction against the mlightenment, the political and philosophical desire for freedom from illegitimate autho-ritybecomes paralysed by the self-defeating attempts of reason to justify itself as a universally competent judge, capable of stopping the desire for freedom from becoming arbitrary and mired in violence and cynicism.
Nevertheless, a further step remains to be taken in this narrative. Almost a century after the sftuggle between Kant and his opponents reached its height, Nietzsche, in thernatising 'modem nihilism' as the most pressing problem of the age, described it as an antagonism between two tendencies-'not to esteemwhat we know, and not to be allowed any longer to esteem the lies we should like to tell ourselves', a 'process of dissolution'. II The philosopher finds herself faced with a fabricated world to which she has 'absolutely no right' sIMPly by virtue of her reason,12and must confront it through the medium of a force that is Ike a surging 'odierness' at the heart of reason itself, namely the will-to-power.
The next chapter will give an account of how Western philosophy comes to be faced by this situation, by showing how reason, at the height of its ambition in German Idealism, subjects itself to this its own deepestpathology. As we will see, the result of Fichte and Schelling's attempts to provide foundational justifications for the right of reason to examine itself result in the discovery of an irrational 'remainder' that is not simply other than reason, but is an otherness that is 'inside' reason, and indeed is its own condition- This will threaten reason with the possibility that it cannol be immanent even to itself.
The sIgnIficance of this choice can only ultimately be proven by the rest of the thesis. Given that my presentation of the trauma of reason is completed with an examination of Schelling, with whom the development of the trauma is consummated, the penod of historical time in which the trauma could be said to be the central if not always acknowledged problem in Western thouglit is one in wbicb Hegel and Deleuze stand at opposite ends, and also one in which Hegel's influence has, up to the present, been largely decisive. Deleuze's desire, to break radically with the Hegelian tradition is, I dunk, particularly suggestiveof the difficulties that philosophical thought faces M the wake of Schelling's critique of a priori reason, for the redefimtion of critique that Deleuze undertakes is, in method, execution and result as I shall show , directly related to the results of Schelling's critique.
I shall argue in Chapters Three and Four that Deleuze's ontological turn against Kantianism and its phenomenological legacy in general perforrns a similar philosophical role to Schelling's ontological turn against Fichte. My emphasis will be on the continuity of Deleuze's thought, from the early 'historical' writings to What is Philosophy? This stress on continuity, and the foregrounding of the Absolute, is in my opinion absolutely necessary in order to grasp the uniquenessof Deleuze's position in post-war French philosophy as an ontological thinker of difference.
For reasons of space, given this concentration on continuity, I have unfortunately had to omit any extended investigation of the specific social-theoretical concems of the two volumes of Caphialisni and Schizophrenia, without, I believe, doing any excessive violence to Deleuze's multifaceted oeuvre, in so far as its developmentis concerned. The notion that Deleuze is simply a bad reader of Hegel, and the opposed idea that Deleuze gets Hegel absolutely right and can thus dispense with him, both evince equally Oedipal attitudes widi a conservative and a radical inflection, respectively.
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This means that, in re- reading Hegel, it is necessaryto point out how Deleuze distorts his work, but this does not immediately serve as a justification for discarding Deleuze. Hence the philosophies of Hegel and Deleuze must be understoodfor themselvesin relation to this issue, before they can be assessedin relatiol. Hume's accountof the empirical origin of ideas, and his distinction between mere relations of ideas and matters of fact compromiseany rationalist faith in pure reasonand mea-nthat a justification of the valldity of a priori judgementsis neededbefore the Enlightenment'sall-encompassingcritique of tradition can claim any degree of success.
I'he political content of this Critique has been well- documented: a revolution directed against 'superstition' by a freethinking 61ite in the tiaine of the powersof universalreason. But in order not to contradictits own aims,the political CrItique requires an epistemology founded upon an objective foundation of reason's authority in disputes concerning legitimacy.
This project of justification drives Kant's mature thought By outlining Kant's crItical project, and the ways in which Fichte and Schellingaddressissuesarising out of this project,this chapterwill determine A- the - meaningof what hasalreadybeenreferredto as the 'traumaof reason'.
“Neither God, nor World”: on the One foreclosed to transcendence
With Hume, psychology becomesa sceptical weapon: reason's functions are constituted according to habit and the rationally unaccountable and contingent passions. An adequate responseto Hume must show that knowledge through reason alone does necessarily or de. Thus Kant's 'subjective turn' entails an examination of reason conductedby reasonitself in order to, following Locke, 'examineour own powers,and seeto what ddngs they fare] ' adapted'. This principle is thus only an abstract idea.
Kant questions the presuppositionsof Buine's genetic account of the 'feeling' ofTeason, by asking how it is possiblethat consciousexperienceshould itself be of sucha characteras to containsuchthings as conjoined representations. The empiricist labula rasa brackets out the question of the that possibility of experience, formal is, of its necessary in constituents, favour of the question of its actual, contingent origins.
For Kant, as for Leibniz, the tabula rasa must itself already possessa certain structure if it is to be capable of representationalconsciousness,i. The miciples that govem transcendental subjectiN are the necessaiy conditions of any expenence of real existence. Kant's responseis that the very Presentation Darstellung of the content of experience itself is only made possible by formal transcendentalprinciples or structures. If oblective knowledge through pure reason alone can be had, then the discursive or rational components of these formal structui-esmust ultimately be the necessat ,conditions of the possibility of the non-discursive formal components.
This practicaldimensionis both moral and political, for it implies both regulationof an individual's own actions,and the possibility of criticising prevailing institutional constraintson individual agency. Humanbeing hastwo major aspects,the powersof cognition and desire C. Reasonthus has a theoreticaland a practical fonn, and Kant's project must be to determine two sets of conditions, for cognitive and for moral experience.
Objective theorefical knowledge is thus only knowledge of objects as determined for the subject under these forms. To represent vorslellen an object as it is in iiselj'is not at all conhwlictory.
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However, preciselybecausethis representsthe object without relating it to the discursiveand non-discursiveconditionsof real objectiveknowledge,Kant to assigns it the statusof the purely ihinkable. Nevertheless,Kant does not entirely follow Hume's injunction to commit such ideas to the 3 DVnes,,aswe shall see. Rationalistmetaphysicsassumesthat reasonis immanentin being-aswe saw in Chapter One with respectto the doctrine of 'innate ideas'.
The ontological proof is the capstoneof this assurance- metaphysics, down to Kant's own day, is satisfied that its objective validity is ultimately analyfic. It believes it can have objective and a priori knowledge of a thing-in-itself, because,above all, the ontological proof demonstratesthat reasonis capableof proving flie existence of the bigbest entity by simply examining it-self and its own idea of God. But the empiricist critique forces a re-evaluation of this assurance,by pomtmg out that the mere analysis of an idea, even wben this is an idea of G xt can only evaluate its logical validity and not its relation to matters of fact.
Kant's response is to give ground to empiricism. Metaphysics assumed that reason, considered as an 'intellect" intuition' independent of sensibility, can objectively represent ForKant, this is a wholly unrestrainedand thereforeIranscenidem tbings-in-themselves. With this in-mind, we can now examine Kant's attempt to Inventory the conditions of possible experience, beginning with the non-discursive- For Kant, the fonns inherent to intuition allow us to both presenta given sensationto ourselvesin empirical experienceas something manifold or differentiated, to and present a priori intuitions of objects, as in geometry.
These forms are a priori becausethey cannot be abstracted from empirical objects-Iinstead, they are if necessary any presentation of an empirical object is to be even possible. I'lus means, tbough, that they are simply forms of our intuitions, and that the manifold of iritultion is only the Erscheinung appearance to of objects in relation us phenomena. CPuR B Kant needsto show, however, that it is reason that legislatesthe forms of possible experience. The opportunity to demonstrate this is offered by The fact that the possibillt , of fonnal intuitions, Le. From the is standpoint of Mtuition, it not possible to exafniiie its essential forms in order to account for them in any way.
This is becauseintuition, being non- discursive and passive, is only 'In' its forms. Reason, on the other band, is spontaneousand capable of reflecting upon itself In CPuR's Deduction', 'Transcendental Kant develops to reflexive arguments sbow that from the of standpoint reason, formal intuitions are only made possible by reason's own structure.
If this Is so, then certain discursive determinations will be necessaryto stabilise any possible intuitive These presentation. Kant differentiates these finite principles of knowledgefrom the infinite but posSibilities unsecured afforded by pure thougbt f 4 with the aid of Wolff s distincitionbetweent wo spontaneous, rational aCUltieS: Understandi Yerstan l and pure Reason Yernunfl.
Ckygill, , p. The deduction of the categorieswill be completed by a final, discursive foundation of possibility: a condition of all the other conditions that requires no ftu-tber proof of its own possibility. Each version also proposes that a foundational condition of possibility must entail the necessary formal unity of all possible contents of consciousness. Kant calls this condition the transcendental unity of apperception. This unity is thus the UnIty of all the possible presentationswhich the subject can have of an object or the in sense which a1l these contents whether a priori or empirical must necessarilybelong to the in same subject order for them to be synthesisediii the fust place.
This unity cannotbe explainedas either a product of mechanicalcausationor as an attributeof noumenal substance,as it is a logical unity required by any representation,including those detertnined representations accordingto the categories of causationand As substance. This self-consciousness is neither knowledge of the subject as a pbenomenalobject nor some'intellectual intuition' of the.
This nituition of existence is, unlike empirical intuitions of subiective states,not given through the mediation of other forinal conditions Cexistence' here is 'not a category'. Neither, however, is it an intellectual intuition of a thing-in-itself. The 'I think' does not thereforeexpressa priori knowledgeof the essenceof a substance,as it did for Descartes. It simply points to an actuality that can neverbe determined for consciousnessunder the rules that make objects of experience possible, as it is itself the condition of A conscious representation.
This logical and negative as opposed to metaphysical, substantialand positive result completesthe formal deductionof the categoriesand the first part of Kant's i ustification of reason. F The Deduction, however, only demonstratesthat a certain formal unity of the subject is for necessary the consciousexperienceof an object in generalto be possible. It doesnot sbow that this unity is actually specifiedas synthetica priori knowledgeof the determinateform of an object.
Kant undertakes this task in the Schernatism and the Analytic of Principles, wbere be to aims show that the categories understood as purely logical functions do provide determinate rules for the synthesis of intuitions. This would demonstrate that the rules of synthesis they 5 Pippin, , pp. Time is the form of inner intuition in which all appearances are given.
Eachcategoryis thus shown to represent a general rule for a synthesis of time. The applicability of this rule to particularintuitions hasto be established. For example, the schemaof pernianenceapplies to the category of substance,while that of im-versible succession applies to causality. For Deleuze, philosophy does something that neither science nor psychoanalysis can do.
It is able to radically interrogate the Other, to put its otherness in question, to find every means possible for questioning its always potentially simulacral, inherently demonic nature. But philosophy as such does not yet help Deleuze to save the idea of immanence for modern philosophy in Difference and Repetition and Logic of Sense. The polemical message of the Circle of Epistemology remains: there is no metalanguage and the Doctrine of Science is impossible. But this is not yet immanence. It will take until the What is Philosophy? In a sense, the Circle of Epistemology had stolen the possibility of immanence from Deleuze in the late 60s.
In Anti-Oedipus , Deleuze turned on the proponents of Lacano-Althusserianism, arguing that their whole approach constituted a scotomization of the mental and social transformations underway in advanced capitalist systems. In the following section we give a brief sketch of some of the key innovations in the theory of capitalism in Anti-Oedipus , indicating how Deleuze only manages to regain immanence in his later work by working through the logic of the capitalist system as a system of immanence. Capitalism and Immanence in Anti-Oedipus. In Anti-Oedipus , Deleuze and Guattari insist that this whole approach is inadequate for dealing with capitalism as a social formation.
They criticise those who wish. For it is certain that, even and especially in their manifestations of extreme force, neither capitalism nor revolution nor schizophrenia follows the paths of the signifier AO Capitalism must instead be understood systematically, they claim, as a system of flows of money and credit. That way out cannot be guaranteed by a commitment to science and a critique of ideology.
Instead, it is necessary to understand the immanent axiomatics of capitalism as a system of money, and to situate it within a longer history of debt. The effect of the tendential global implementation of the axiomatic of capitalism is what Deleuze and Guattari deterritorialization : the capitalist market rips up and reinvests social fields with the sole end of extracting surplus value. The value of something depends on the human labour put into extracting it or making it.
Then, having shown that money is the form taken by abstract labour, Marx is able to describe the process of the extraction of surplus value from the labour put in by workers absolute surplus value: lengthening the working day, and relative surplus value: curtailment of necessary labour time through mechanization. Marx considers it necessary to begin [the book Capital ] with a study of money in its general aspect, independent of the capitalist form of production in order, among other things, to determine its role in the capitalist form of production.
This makes Section 1 represent a sort of theory of the non-theory of money. Such an interpretation is erroneous; in the first section of Capital , Marx gives a general theory of the circulation of commodities and money. The causes of this error lie in a poor understanding of the structure of the capitalist form of production, which combines economic elements differing in nature, origin, and manner of action; its consequence is to aggravate this misunderstanding.
One becomes unable to see how the general laws of monetary circulation continue to function in the capitalist mode of production where there is a special monetary circulation, that of credit Suzanne de Brunhoff, Marx on Money , trans. Goldbloom, As Deleuze and Guattari put it:. It is not the same money that goes into the pocket of the wage-earner and is entered on the balance sheet of a commercial enterprise.
The fact that banks participate in both, that they are situated at the pivotal point between financing and payment only demonstrates their multiple interactions. Thus, in credit money, which comprises all the commercial and bank credits, purely commercial credit has its roots in simple circulation where money develops as a means of payment bills of exchange falling due on a fixed date, which constitute a monetary form of finite debt. Inversely, bank credit effects a demonetarization or dematerialization of money, and is based on the circulation of drafts [ traites ] instead of the circulation of money.
Hence once is correct in speaking of a profound dissimulation between the two forms of money, payment and financing — the two aspects of banking practice. While it is true that capitalism is industrial in its essence or mode of production, it functions only as merchant capitalism. While it is true that it is filiative industrial capital in its essence, it functions only through its alliance with commercial and financial capital. In a sense, it is the bank that controls the whole system and the investment of desire.
That is why it is unfortunate that Marxist economists too often dwell on considerations concerning the mode of production, and on the theory of money as the general equivalent as found in the first section of Capital , without attaching enough importance to banking practice, to financial operations, and to the specific circulation of credit money — which would be the meaning of a return to Marx, to the Marxist theory of money AO But Deleuze and Guattari suggest that the production of consumption in capitalism occurs relatively independently of the State, and the State is rather a reaction to it.
There is a polarity between deterritorializing Capital and the reterritorializing State in Deleuze and Guattari that is not present in Negri. Their respective approaches to what has happened in the world economy from the s onward are correspondingly different. A Negrian autonomist would be expected to say that there is no free market capitalism, and that the State always intervenes.
Anti-Oedipus was published in , at the moment when the phase of State regulation of capitalism was at its height in Europe. The Bretton Woods agreement, put in place after the Depression, had collapsed, as had the gold standard as a standard of convertibility. The period directly after is marked by a gradual deregulation of capitalism.
In the s, the principles of free market economics were embraced by the British and American governments, and have been ever since. From the perspective of Anti-Oedipus , what has occurred over the last 30 years — the period usually assigned in historiography to a generation — is a deregulation of capitalism and a retreat from the State form. The current division of the world economy rests on an abundant labour supply, largely located in Asia, and an unusual expansion of financial markets in the West.
But that was — are the flows deterritiorialized and decoded enough now? But that would appear to result in the kind of nightmare of a pure, all-encompassing immanence of the market anticipated with dread by Frankfurt School Marxists like Adorno and Horkheimer. It is a book that spells out an apocalyptic scenario, and in order to impress its urgency upon us, offers no reassurance whatsoever. No social formation appears to be possible beyond capitalism, which realises in parodic form the immanence that was blocked from realisation in philosophy.
If immanence is impossible in philosophy as the Lacanian-Althusserians maintained , then it realises itself, almost in revenge, in the ravaging deterritorializations of advanced capitalism. Without being able to analyse the reasons for the shift here, it is clear that What is Philosophy?
It is easy to see why Deleuze and Guattari want to defend this position, after the trauma of abolishing immanence and reincarnating it in capitalism — but, in the light of the questions raised at the beginning of this paper, the problem of precisely how to defend Spinozist immanence still remains for readers of Deleuze today.
Just because it is the best and most desirable does not mean that it is possible.
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How far is this pantheistic, quasi-mystical element in Spinozism — with its promises of identity with the mind of God — responsible for its utopian dimensions in the late re-affirmation of Spinoza in What is Philosophy? Becoming animal, plant, molecular, becoming zero.
This is true of all the arts. Art undoes the triple organisation of perceptions, affections, and opinions in order to substitute a monument composed of percepts, affects, and blocs of sensations that takes the place of language. It is about listening […] This is precisely the task of all art.
It is a tidy, self- satisfying, teleological move. As Hegel summarises:. The True is the whole. But the whole is nothing other than the essence consummating itself through its development. Of the Absolute, it must be said that it is essentially a result , that only in the end is it what it truly is; and that precisely in this consists its nature, viz. To be actual, subject, the spontaneous becoming of itself . This is because the present — as present, i. A rhetorically demanding Hegel explains it thus:. We write down this truth; a truth cannot lose anything by being written down, any more than it can lose anything through our preserving it.
If now, this noon , we look again at the written truth we shall have to say that it has become stale. The Now that is , is another Now than the one pointed to, and we see that the Now is just this: to be no more, just when it is. The Now, as it is pointed out to us, is Now that has been , and this is its truth; it has not the truth of being. Yet this much is true, that it has been. Removed from its ground synthesis , i. The Here pointed out, to which I hold fast, is similarly a This.
The Above is itself similarly this manifold otherness of above, below, etc. The Here, which was supposed to have been pointed out, vanishes in other Heres, but these likewise vanish. What is pointed out, held fast, and abides is a negative This, which is negative only when the Heres are taken as they should be, but in being so taken they dispersed themselves; what abides is a simple complex of many Heres. The Here that is meant would be the point; but is not; on the contrary, when it is pointed out as something that is, the pointing-out shows itself to be not an immediate knowing [of the point], but a movement from the Here that is meant through many Heres into the universal Here which is a simple plurality of Heres, just as the day is a simply plurality of Nows.
It often seemed and in some quarters, still does , that the price of fighting to create a wholly different set of anti-oedipal identities and, with it, a wholly new set of social order s might just be worth the price of enduring, just for a moment or two, all the rotting bad smells of the Hegelian identi-kit corpse.
The dangers to allow otherwise, were too grave. At its most simple form, arboreal philosophy could be understood in this manner: Take as a given a seed, say for example, an acorn. Most crucially, then, and no matter what the seed might do, be it wishing, hoping, praying or even becoming a political militant , it would only-ever keep unfolding towards its proverbial goal The Old Oak Tree.
All of arborescent culture is founded on them, from biology to linguistics.
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Because, then, for the first time in a rather long time, not only would philosophy have caught up with the very reality it had been seeking to inhabit: i. It would mean bearing witness to our contemporary age in an active, participant manner, rather than as mere drones, couch potatoes or passer-bys. An epoch whereby wholly different end-games-as-mid-games become networked orders of the day, producing, expressing and demanding, quite different politics, ethics, science and art — not to mention timings and spatialities — than those encountered by our Ancient, Modernist and postmodernist cousins, barely visible with a Metaphysical lens.
Long spoons were at the ready. And yet, despite being such a wildly provocative intra-species guest-list, they did seem to have at least one thing in common however differently each, in their own distinctive way, might have approached it. And to this absence of morality corresponds, must correspond, the search for an art of existence. But it was a cartography that ventured beyond the concrete walls of the Universal Concept itself.
For the concepts Deleuze and Guattari started to invoke were curiously beginning to take on the atmosphere of not quite being concepts at all, at least not in the sense that Hegel would have meant. But neither were they non-concepts i. The fractal points of resistance, curiosity, anger, boredom and etc — otherwise called rhizomes — instead enframed the very journey of their de-territorializing map making with whole series of mutant relativities and viral assemblages.
A deterritorialisation that helped stave off organisation, stratification, sedimentation, all the sine qua non for fascist massification. But you are already on it, scurrying like a vermin, groping like a blind person, or running like a lunatic: desert traveller and nomad of the steppes…Experimentation: not only radiophonic but also biological and political, incurring censorship and repression. Corpus and Socius, politics and experimentation. They will not let you experiment in peace.